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24 September 1965

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

FBI REVIEW COMPLETED

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

[Redacted box]

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
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
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
*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)

Communist Political Developments: The Hanoi government issued an official memorandum on 23 September setting forth its present position on negotiating an end to the Vietnam war. The document does not contain any new proposals on the conflict, but it does give the appearance of flexibility on some points. Although it calls, for example, for the inclusion of the Liberation Front in any talks on the conflict, it does not specify, as have many past DRV statements, that a settlement must be in "accordance" with the Front's program. It does not, moreover, explicitly rule out the possibility of participation in talks by representatives of the Saigon government.

Consistent with assurances in private by DRV representatives, the memorandum does not make the withdrawal of US forces a prior condition necessary for starting negotiations on the conflict. The use of formal United Nations machinery to effect a settlement is ruled out, but there is no explicit denunciation of private mediation by UN members or personnel. The memorandum demands once again that the US "solemnly declare its acceptance" of the DRV four point proposal of 8 April on the Vietnam problem, but pegs this to a "political settlement" and not specifically to the initiation of negotiations.

The memorandum is notable for its failure to refer to bloc assistance should the US continue to "intensify" the war. It promises only more "vigorous" resistance by the "Vietnamese people" and asserts a conviction that the Vietnamese are capable of defeating the US through their "own" strength.

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The Military Situation in South Vietnam: No large-scale ground activity in South Vietnam has been reported during the past 24 hours, although widespread skirmishing included several bitterly contested engagements.

A US Army company encountered stiff resistance during an assault on Viet Cong defensive positions yesterday near Bien Hoa Air Base. In addition to close air support, the US unit used artillery, recoilless rifles, and flamethrowers in the attack on a network of enemy bunkers. Twelve US personnel were reported wounded. The number of Viet Cong casualties was not immediately available.

Farther north, a Vietnamese Popular Force unit, reinforced by regular troops, beat off an enemy attack northwest of Hue, reportedly killing 15 Viet Cong and capturing eight weapons. Government casualties were described as light.

Elsewhere, Viet Cong forces early yesterday attacked a US Special Forces camp 50 miles west of Saigon with mortar and recoilless rifle fire, reportedly inflicting light casualties among the defenders. Heavy artillery fire supporting the besieged camp finally forced an enemy withdrawal. An estimated 30 Viet Cong also attacked a government militia outpost in the delta area south of Saigon, although no losses were reported for either side.

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*India-Pakistan: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)
The cease-fire appears to be fully in effect along the Indian-West Pakistan border, but there are reports of increasing violence in Kashmir.

Last night an Indian spokesman claimed that Pakistani troops crossed the cease-fire line some 90 miles northwest of Jammu, in Kashmir. There is no confirmation of this or other reported minor incidents along the Kashmir front, but claims and counterclaims of this nature can be expected in future weeks.

The Pakistani radio reported yesterday that more than 80 Indian troops had been killed by Kashmiri "Freedom Fighters" [redacted] in a 24-hour period. At the same time, the clandestine Voice of Kashmir radio, which claims to speak for the infiltrators, stated that the guerrilla war of liberation would be maintained. The broadcast said "It is for us to make the decision, and that decision is to continue the fight." The Pakistanis can be expected to give prominence to reports of fighting in Kashmir in an attempt to keep both domestic and world attention focused on the problem.

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New Delhi has admitted that guerrilla activities continue in Kashmir and has warned that operations to liquidate the infiltrators will be stepped up. Indian Defense Minister Chavan told parliament yesterday that India regarded the presence of the guerrillas in Kashmir as a matter separate from the truce agreement and that Indian troops had been given strict instructions to deal with them.

Indian Prime Minister Shastri yesterday formally accepted Moscow's invitation to meet with Pakistani President Ayub on Soviet soil in an attempt to reconcile their differences. Ayub accepted the Soviet invitation in principle on 21 September. Press reports indicate, however, that no meeting can be expected until the cease-fire has been consolidated.

(continued)

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Indian Ambassador to Washington Nehru, in a press interview yesterday, stated that India was not prepared after 18 years to regard the original UN proposals for a Kashmir settlement as still being the "correct solution" to the problem. In a statement of 22 September the Indian education minister said that Kashmir was an integral part of India, adding that there could be no political discussions between India and Pakistan.

The Pakistani press and public continue to view the cease-fire as having been forced on Pakistan by the UN and the major powers at a time when Pakistani arms were winning the war. The press gives the picture of a strong Pakistan agreeing to grant the big powers and the UN a last chance to find a peaceful solution to the issue. Thus the stage is set to blame the UN and the major powers--including the US and the USSR--if no solution is found.

The UN continues its efforts to staff an enlarged observer group in Kashmir. Twenty-eight officers from the UN truce supervision organization in Palestine are to leave for Kashmir shortly, according to a UN spokesman there. Sweden also announced assignment of six officers to the mission, complementing the number previously announced by Canada and Denmark. UN Secretary General Thant wants a 100-man team to supervise the cease-fire line both in Kashmir and in the Punjab.

However, Soviet delegate to the UN Fedorenko yesterday protested Thant's action in recruiting additional personnel for supervision of the cease-fire on the subcontinent as well as the estimated expenditure of \$1.6 million for this purpose. Fedorenko claims that both the assignment of new personnel and the concomitant expenditures require specific Security Council authorization.

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Turkey: Large-scale youth demonstrations may occur this week end and could assume an anti-Western aspect.

The demonstrators are demanding the resignation of the minister of energy and national resources who, they claim, is a "puppet of foreign oil interests." Petroleum policy is a prominent issue in Turkey's current national election campaign. [The radical fringe of the opposition Republican Peoples Party has advocated nationalization of the Turkish petroleum industry. The dominant Justice Party is opposed to nationalization, but is being forced by political pressures to tighten the government's control over international, including US, oil companies.]

Anti-Western sentiment is on the increase in Turkey, sparked largely by dissatisfaction over Ankara's failure to receive Western support on the Cyprus issue. The predominant American presence has already made the US the primary target of this feeling, which will probably increase.

Only peaceful demonstrations are being planned, but the charged atmosphere of the election campaign increases the possibility of violence.

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Dominican Republic: The military chiefs have again expressed to Garcia Godoy their concern over the delay in collecting rebel arms.




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On 21 September the rebels made available to the provisional government a small quantity of arms, many of which are unserviceable. A verification committee which toured the rebel area found several military strongpoints abandoned. The committee was shown an arsenal containing a large quantity of "unusable and unused" weapons that will evidently be turned over to the government.

Garcia Godoy is reportedly upset over the slow pace of disarmament and has expressed determination to proceed rapidly with integration of the rebel zone, but his actions indicate a reluctance to push the issue at this time.

Meanwhile, it is not clear whether ex-President Juan Bosch will go through with his plan to return to Santo Domingo this week end. He has made conflicting statements in the past few days as to whether he will arrive tonight or tomorrow. Bosch is thought to be concerned over his personal safety and he may find a pretext for canceling the trip at the last moment.)

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USSR: Signs of disagreement within the Soviet leadership continue, with a plenary meeting of the party central committee only a few days away.

Izvestia yesterday published a strong endorsement of economic reform measures sharply at variance with the line taken by the party's economic newspaper last week. Earlier this month, Pravda, mouthpiece of the party, and Izvestia, the official government paper, were at odds over cultural policy. The editor of Pravda was subsequently replaced. Izvestia has been without a chief editor since last May when the successor to Adzhubey, V. I. Stepakov, was transferred to propaganda work in the party apparatus.

The unusual spectacle of conflict in the authoritative Soviet press, especially over matters such as economic policy which is likely to be considered at next week's plenum, occurs at a time when rumors of impending changes in the top leadership continue to mount.

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NOTES

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Syria: The cabinet reshuffle announced on 23 September reflects no significant change in the Baathist power structure. The new prime minister, Dr. Yusuf Zuayyin, has been a member of Syria's five-man executive council. Strong man Hafiz, who had held the post of prime minister, will remain as military commander in chief and chairman of the presidential council and continue to direct policy.

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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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